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ABSTRACT  
 
The notion of systemic thinking for social and ecological responsibility is 
deconstructed and its holistic potential examined from a critical systemic perspective 
informed by the ideas of the systems philosopher, C. West-Churchman.  Systemic 
thinking involves being critically aware of the boundaries in which we work and the 
boundaries to which we apply our expertise.  It involves making boundary judgements 
based on appropriate practical and theoretical interaction resulting in action which, it 
is argued, serves an explicit emancipatory potential.  Social and ecological factors are 
considered as those components lying outside the boundaries of the system of interest 
and therefore outside the control of those, including systems practitioners, involved in 
the system of interest.  Response-ability relates to how well a system of interest 
responds to its environment of social and ecological factors. The potential value and 
dilemma of ‘systemic thinking for social and ecological responsibility’ is captured in 
Churchman’s discomforting call for systems practitioners to perpetually be open to 
and invite ‘enemies’.  
 
1 Introduction 
 
In a special issue on Systems Thinking for Social Responsibility in the journal Systems 
Research and Behavioural Science, the editorial tells a story of various interests 
amongst Operational Research (OR) and Systems practitioners in recent years around 
the theme ‘systems thinking for social and environmental responsibility’ (Gregory and 
Midgely 2003).  One initiative detailed in the editorial which I became involved with 
is the establishment of a new network, Systemic Thinking for Social and 
Environmental Responsibility (ST-SER Network).1 
 
This article is an attempt at describing my own understanding of social and 
environmental responsibility from a critical systemic perspective. In this paper I use 
the term ‘ecological’ instead of ‘environmental’.  The reason is that in  
Systems thinking the ‘environment’ is used in a different sense from that of the natural 
environment.  A fundamental boundary in systems thinking is that between a system 
and its environment. From a systems perspective, factors in the ‘natural environment’ 
like water, soil, crops, livestock etc. very often fall within the boundaries of a system - 
e.g., components of a farming household system. From a general systems perspective, 
the environment consists of factors outside the system’s boundary; factors not 
controlled by the system (e.g., the supply mechanisms for fertilizer or weather 
conditions in relation to the farming household system) but which have relevance to 
the system’s performance.  Also, I will refer to systems as constituting systems of 
interest relating to ‘maps’ of the territory of the real world imbued with some human 
relevance, rather than as some actual objective ‘territory’ existing in the real world. 
 
The paper is divided into two halves.  The first half, comprising of the next three 
sections, provide some general appreciation of the terms ‘systemic thinking’, ‘social 
and ecological factors’, and ‘response-ability’. Drawing mostly on the works of the 
systems philosopher/ practitioner C. West-Churchman, social and ecological factors 
                                                                 
1 For further details see the ST-SER Network website www.st-ser.net . 
are demarcated in terms of belonging either to the system of interest or its 
environment.  Churchman’s notion of inviting enemies is further identified as 
particularly significant to appreciating the discomfort associated with incidences of 
critical systemic responsibility. The second half of the paper gives a more holistic 
portrayal of a critical systemic perspective on social and ecological responsibility. 
Drawing on my own research experience, two examples of such discomforting 
incidences are provided.  In each case, two systems of interest are referred to: a first 
order system belonging to the subject matter being researched, and a second order 
system in which my own involvement as a researcher is included.   
 
2 Systemic thinking 
 
 
Whilst the term ‘systemic’ has gained considerable positive popular currency, its 
precise meaning appears often to be presumed. I draw on four descriptions used by 
systems practitioners to explain my own understanding of systemic thinking. The four 
prompts involve descriptions of (i) a systemic approach, (ii) systemic intervention (iii) 
systemic boundary critique, and (iv) critical systemic thinking.  Bell and Morse (1999) 
in defining a systemic approach to sustainability analysis suggest the need for a change 
in the mindset of an intervener,  "from an observer divorced from context (first order) to 
an observer deeply involved in the context (second order)… (and consequently)… the 
movement from reductionist to holistic paradigms" (ibid p.84).  To emphasise the 
approach envisaged they quote on two occasions the comments from Buddrus, in 
relation to the transformation of awareness required from practitioners of first order 
cybernetics to practitioners of second order cybernetics:   
 
"… the transition of oneself from an observer of a reality which is considered to be 
outside oneself, to a participant in the same reality, and then towards being a co-
creator of that reality, requires fundamental cognitive and emotional reorientation"  
(Buddrus, 1996, quoted in Bell and Morse, 1999 p. 85, p. 99. My italics) 
 
The three inter-relating though complementary roles of a systemic practitioner 
signalled in italics above are evident in the second description of a systemic approach 
as provided by Midgley (2000; 2003).  In the latter paper, Midgley argues that 
‘observation’ skills, commonly associated with natural science, ought to be 
considered a key component of systemic intervention. Systemic intervention is here 
defined as “purposeful action by an agent to create change in relation to boundaries” 
(p.89). Midgley specifies three dimensions of a methodology for systemic 
intervention. First, there is the need for agents to engage with boundary critique in 
reflecting critically upon the choices between what ought to be included within, and 
therein excluded from, the remit of study or intervention (including issues and 
people). Second, there is a need to focus on theoretical and methodological pluralism  
as a means of making a judgement on choices between theories and methods. Third, 
an adequate systemic methodology should be explicit about defining the parameters 
of, and acting for, improvement. Although not explicitly stated, the three activities of 
systemic intervention reflect precisely Midgley's own interpretation of three 
commitments associated with 'critical systems thinking' (CST) (Midgley 1996). 
 
Gerald Midgley’s 2003 paper focuses particularly on the systemic dimension of 
methodological pluralism as a route to embrace the notion of scientific ‘observation’ 
as constituent of systemic intervention. This concern for methodological pluralism 
and choice might be seen as reflecting a peculiar central feature of CST as expressed 
since the mid 1990s at the Centre for Systems Studies at Hull University where 
Midgley works. My third source of inspiration for clarifying systemic thinking is 
Werner Ulrich who identifies himself within a distinctly different strand of CST 
(Ulrich 2003).  Ulrich describes the usefulness of CST for professional reflective 
practice in terms of  providing ‘critically systemic discourse’ which he characterises 
as systemic boundary critique (based on his earlier detailed work on ‘critical systems 
heuristics’ (Ulrich 1983)). Ulrich’s parameters can be compared directly with 
Midgley’s three dimensions of systemic intervention.  First, like Midgley, Ulrich 
reinforces the need for boundary critique as an a priori constituent of systemic 
thinking. However, and this relates to the second dimension, rather than having a 
consensus-seeking ‘pluralism’ as the main driver, Ulrich’s systemic boundary critique 
focuses on critical argumentation as a basis for a discursive approach. Ulrich also 
makes the point that such a discursive approach needs to provide for the public sphere 
by involving and serving public citizens.  Third, there is a shift of emphasis from a 
concern over methodological choice to a concern for an emancipatory constituent 
inherent within critical argumentation.  Whereas Midgley moves away from the use of 
the word ‘emancipation’, preferring instead to use ‘improvement’ as a more explicitly 
subjective term (i.e., improvement for whom?), Ulrich argues for a more robust and 
deeper usage of the term emancipation.  Here, it is not simply used as an ideological 
commitment on behalf of the practitioner, but as a deeper constituent underpinning 
the methodological commitment of critique. 
 
Both Midgley and Ulrich are very much influenced by my own fourth source of 
inspiration for describing systemic thinking, C. West-Churchman (1971; 1979).  
Churchman’s work has been described (appropriately, in my view) as constituting 
critical systemic thinking (Flood 1999).2 We can relate Churchman’s ideas to Bell and 
Morse, Midgley, and Ulrich. First, Churchman is a pioneer in the shift from first to 
second order cybernetics.  He was one of the first to make the epistemological leap in 
suggesting that systems are not objective entities simply waiting to be ‘observed’. 
Systems are better described in terms of ‘whole systems judgements’ used primarily 
to raise peoples’ understandings through positing the right questions rather than 
seeking some absolute truth through advancing supposedly right answers.  Crucially, 
what gives a system its character is ‘purpose’.  The boundaries of any system are 
therefore initially defined in terms of purpose. Churchman describes the critique of 
boundaries in terms of, firstly, a ‘sweep in process’, whereby boundaries of a 
purposeful system might be extended to incorporate different meanings, and secondly, 
a ‘process of unfolding’, a critical counterpart where the boundaries might be more 
critically examined with respect to different meanings.  A second key feature of 
Churchman’s systemic thinking is not just the incidence and exposure of multiple and 
often conflicting values in systemic intervention, as revealed in the process of 
unfolding, but the necessity for managing diversity and conflict.  Along with Ulrich, 
Churchman does not subscribe to the idea of consensus-seeking as the main driver for 
systemic intervention, but does emphasise the importance of allowing for critique, 
                                                                 
2 In this book, Robert Flood uses Churchman’s work amongst other systems writers to critique and reveal 
the inadequacy of the influential and popular interpretation of ‘systemic thinking’ as embodied in the title 
of Peter Senge’s book The Fifth Discipline. 
debate and argumentation.  Finally, Churchman’s work, as Flood (1999) reminds us, 
is imbued with an “intensity of feeling about a moral commitment to human 
betterment” (p.66).  In the same way that Midgley argues for a commitment to action 
for improvement, Churchman talked of the need for securing improvement.  
 
In line with Churchman and Midgley, I think there ought to be an article of faith and 
hope (idealism) attached to systemic thinking. Whilst agreeing with Ulrich (2003) in 
his concern for retrieving the emancipatory interest as a methodological imperative in 
dealing with what he calls the structural asymmetries of discourse, I would also argue 
for the retrieval of an ideological imperative. In my view, an emancipatory intent 
signals not just a methodological commitment towards effective communication for 
systems practitioners and public citizens in the argumentative realm (as argued 
particularly by Ulrich), but also a broader moral commitment towards addressing 
coercive forces of power and deception in the non-argumentative realm.  Such forces 
are the result of our (human) systems design and implementation, and they act on 
human as well as non-human nature.   The ethical orientation of systemic thinking 
triggers questions as to (i) who and/or what is affected by systems design and 
implementation, and (ii) what might be an appropriate response to such effects.  In 
short, what do we understand by social and ecological responsibility from a systemic 
perspective? Churchman, and some further elaboration of Churchman’s work by 
Ulrich, enables us to address such questions. 
3 Social and ecological factors  
 
 
From a critical systemic perspective the system/ environment boundary described in 
the introduction is in my view also significant in separating those factors involved 
with a system of interest from those factors affected by a system of interest. 
Churchman, whilst acknowledging the system’s environment, dealt initially with only 
conditions associated with those involved in a system of interest. He identified nine 
conditions (derived from Kantian philosophy) that must be fulfilled for a system (S) 
to demonstrate purposefulness. The conditions are reproduced in summary below 
(adapted from Churchman, 1971 p.43) 
 
1. S is teleological (or 'purposeful') 
2. S has a measure of performance 
3. There is a client whose interests are served by S 
4. S has teleological components which co-produce the measure of performance of S 
5. S has an environment (both social and ecological components) 
6. S has a decision maker who can produce changes in the measure of performance of 
S’s components and hence changes in the measure of performance of S 
7. S has a designer who influences the decision maker 
8. The designer aims to maximise S’s value to the client 
9. There is a built in guarantee that the purpose of S defined by the designer’s notion 
of the measure of performance can be achieved and secured 
 
Churchman later reordered these nine conditions into three groups of three categories; 
each group corresponding with a particular social role - client, decision maker, and 
planner (1979 p.79).  Each category is associated with two allied categories which 
Ulrich (1983) later termed role specific concerns and key problems. Ulrich also 
identified each category group with a term reflecting the primary source of influence - 
motivation, control, and expertise - for client, decision maker, and planner (or 
“designer”) respectively (p.250) (see Table 1). 
 
Churchman’s 1971 
nine conditions for a 
purposeful system 
Churchman’s 1979 three groups of 
three categories for a purposeful 
system 
 
Ulrich’s 1983 sources of 
influence informing a 
purposeful system  
 
Group 1  
condition 3. social role: client sources of motivation: whose 
condition 1. role specific concerns: purpose purposes are served? 
condition 2. key problems: measure of performance  
 
Group 2  
condition 6. social role: decision maker sources of control: who has 
condition 4. role specific concerns: components the power to decide? 
condition 5. key problems: environment  
 
Group 3  
condition 7. social role: planner/designer sources of expertise: who 
condition 8. role specific concerns: implementation has the know-how? 
condition 9. key problems: guarantor  
 
Table 1 Categories of ‘Involved’ in a Purposeful System’s Design  
(adapted from Ulrich, 1983:245-250) 
 
Later, Churchman (1979 p.80) also signalled a role for those affected by, but not 
involved with, systems design, and provides a self-reflective description of an 
additional three categories that centre around the role of what he called the systems 
philosopher; along with the two related categories, the enemies of the systems 
approach (‘role concerns’) and significance (‘key problems’).  It is Ulrich (1983) in 
his formulation of critical systems heuristics (CSH) who systematically distinguishes 
between those involved in a system’s design and those affected by a systems design so 
as to define the latter role more concisely for social systems planning. The category of 
those affected by, but not involved in, systems design are designated by Ulrich as 
being the witness; those who in practical discourse will argue the case of the affected.  
The role specific concerns of the witness are conceptualised as those of emancipation; 
liberation from oppressive material conditions and false consciousness, or the 
promises and premises or power and deception associated with the dominant system.  
The final ‘key problem’ category represents the possibilities of a conflict in 
worldviews (‘Weltanschauung’) - “different visions of what social reality and human 
life in it ought to be” (p.252) - between the involved and the affected.  Consequently 
the “source of influence” for this category group is defined as the source of 
legitimisation. Table 2 summarises Ulrich’s twelve “critical-heuristic categories”. 
 
 
Categories  Dimensions of intentionality 
1 
2  
3 
Client?  
Purpose?  
Measure of      
improvement? 
(role) 
(concerns) 
(problems) 
 
Sources of 
motivation 
 
4 
5  
6 
Decision maker? 
Components? 
Environment? 
(role) 
(concerns) 
(problems) 
 
Sources of  
control 
 
Those involved 
7 
8  
9 
Planner? 
Expertise? 
Guarantor? 
(role) 
(concerns) 
(problems) 
sources of 
expertise 
 
10 
11 
12 
Witness? 
Emancipation? 
Worldview? 
(role) 
(concerns) 
(problems) 
sources of 
legitimisation 
Those affected 
 
 
The purposeful 
system of interest in 
its environment 
(or context  
of application) 
on which depends 
the meaning of 
‘improvement’ 
 
Table 2 Critical-Heuristic Categories. 
(adapted from Ulrich, 1983 p.258) 
 
To what extent might the twelve CSH categories be translated into social and 
ecological factors?  There are three general issues to note. 
 
1. Categories are heuristic : Categories are not presented as constituting absolute real-
world entities (e.g., often the ‘roles’ are interchangeable) but rather learning 
devices for attempting to understand or make sense of situations or systems of 
interest.  The categories are only relevant to a system of interest as defined by a 
purpose.   
2. Stakeholders and Stakes: The categories can be a source for identifying the range 
of ‘stakeholders’ (categories 1,4,7, and 10) – social factors - and their concerns or 
‘stakes’ (categories 2,5,8 and 11) – social and ecological factors - relevant to any 
particular situation of interest.3 Along with Vos (2002), I have personally found 
these categories highly useful for stakeholder analyses associated with research.  
For any focus of research (considered as a system of interest), it is useful to 
identify, first, the underlying purpose of the system and associated intended 
beneficiaries, second, the resources needed to enable the system to work and those 
in command of such resources, and third, the expertise and associated experts used 
to secure success of the system’s purpose. From a critical systemic perspective, it 
also imperative to (i) think about short and long term possible effects of the 
system of interest, and those who may represent the interests of the affected, and 
(ii) reflect on the location of the researcher as a key stakeholder (see note 5 
below).  
3. Anthropocentric (‘social’) bias: The 12 categories are human-centred 
(anthropocentric in character).  Ecological factors are only represented as ‘role 
concerns’ or ‘key problems’ in relation to human defined ‘roles’.  Given that 
‘systems’, at least in the first instance of understanding, are simply conceptual 
frameworks, and hence inevitably anthropocentric, the issue, in my view, is how 
we critically deal with our anthropocentric bias rather than pursuing some extreme 
ecocentric ideal in supposedly removing such bias.4  For example, given a 
                                                                 
3 Where ‘future generations’ are considered as stakeholders, this is treated as a key concern (category 11) 
associated with the ‘witness’ (category 10). 
4 Ulrich makes a similar point Ulrich, W. (1993). "Some Difficulties With Holistic Thinking." Systems 
Practice 6(6): 583-608. 
particular system of interest, the heuristic enables us to question the extent to 
which it might be right or appropriate to treat a particular ecological factor as a 
resource for that system (category 5) rather than as an entity with its own intrinsic 
value (category 11).  
 
There are two further issues to note with particular respect to a critical systemic 
perspective on social and ecological responsibility. 
 
4. The ‘environment’ and the ‘affected’: The system’s ‘environment’ (category 6) is 
identified as a key problem category associated with the decision maker. It is 
problematised since it consists of those factors (both social and ecological) which 
are not under the control of the decision maker – i.e. factors, components or 
resources (both social and ecological) that are normally constituent of category 5 - 
but which can nevertheless possibly have an effect on the system.  From a critical 
systemic perspective, such factors might also be constituent of categories 10, 11 
and 12.  What this means is that the system’s environment is not only constituent 
of factors that may affect the system (non-component but relevant) but also, 
significantly, factors that are affected by the system (non-component and, in an 
immediate sense, non-relevant).  From a systemic viewpoint, given that such 
social and ecological factors might be affected by the system suggests that these 
factors may in time have a reciprocal effect on the system and hence acquire 
relevance.  Hence, whilst such factors are de facto marginalised (not component) 
they might nevertheless be the source of unforeseen consequences.  Features of 
this broader understanding of a system’s environment (and associated factors) 
from a critical viewpoint can thus be summarised: (a) non-component to the 
system of interest (SoI); (b) unbounded (from viewpoint of the SoI) and hence 
‘irrational’ (from viewpoint of the SoI); (c) constituent of both social and 
ecological factors; (d) independent of the SoI, or out of the remit of control from 
decision makers associated with the SoI; (e) immediately relevant to the SoI with 
regards to having an (uncontrolled) effect (or influence) on the SoI; and (f) 
relevant in longer term with regards to being affected (or influenced) by the SoI 
with possible unforeseen consequences or effects. 
5. Role of the systemic practitioner: The practitioner or other ‘expert’ can be 
understood as a key ‘social factor’ who can take on board two roles; one primary 
and one secondary. The primary ‘expert’ role associated with any system of 
interest is that of category 7, the ‘planner’ or in Churchman’s original terms, the 
‘designer’.  Here the practitioner is an involved participant in the system of 
interest though, significantly (as a heuristic ideal!), not under the control of the 
decision maker.  Decisionism is the term given when expertise is under the control 
of decision makers (effectively a component of category 5. See Figure 1 below).  
The expert’s role is to provide some kind of guarantee or security (i.e. expertise 
within expert support) that the system’s stated purpose (category 2) can be 
achieved. The key problem associated with this role is the fact that an expert 
cannot be an absolute guarantor given the uncertainties associated with the 
unknowable.5  A secondary role for the reflective systemic practitioner, as part of 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
  
5 Both Churchman and Ulrich, drawing on Kantian critique, make clear that such guarantees can never be 
absolute.  Elsewhere I have attempted to map out some parameters of co-guarantor attributes Reynolds, 
M. (2001). Co-Guarantor Attributes: A Systemic Approach to Evaluating Expert Support . Eighth 
the expert role, I would argue, is that of category 10, the ‘witness’.  Together, 
these two roles address Churchman’s concern for what he calls the total relevant 
system. This dualistic role is the subject of discussion in the next section. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
European Conference on Information Technology Evaluation: Conference Proceedings, Oriel College, 
Oxford. 
   
4 Response-ability 
 
Figure 1 below illustrates the dimensions of response from experts to different 
stakeholders and stakes (social and ecological factors) associated with a system of 
interest and its environment. The diagram uses the critic al heuristic categories 
presented in Table 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Dimensions of responsibility associated with expert support 
 
The two ovals represent the totality of social and ecological factors to which an expert 
ought to be responsive.  The oval representing what I term ‘systems responsibility’ 
represents those factors to which an expert is normally expected to respond to as part 
of the terms of reference for intervention. The risks of overstating the responsibilities 
in this sphere reside in tendencies towards (i) conjuring up false expectations to 
placate intended beneficiaries (deception/ spin), (ii)  allowing those in command of 
resources (associated with the system of interest) to have similar command over 
expert judgement (decisionism), and (iii) allowing a particular persuasive form of 
supposed value-free expertise in the form of objective scientism to override all other 
judgements (technocentrism).  The oval representing what I term ‘critical systemic 
responsibility’ represent those factors outside the boundaries of the particular system 
of interest to which the expert is serving, but which may in a different place and time 
have emergent effects.  Although there are risks of overstating the responsibilities in 
this sphere in terms of either blind human-centred (social) concerns 
(anthropocentrism) or blind ecocentric (ecological) concerns (ecocentrism), ideally 
Internal (SoI) responsibility 
 
 
Responsibility 
of  
expert support  
Intended 
beneficiaries 
Decision 
makers 
Experts 
in the field 
External (wider) responsibility 
 
 
Witnesses 
The 
‘involved’ 
 
The 
‘affected’ 
 
Systems  
Responsibility  
with risks of: 
 
1. deception/ spin 
2. decisionism 
3. technocentrism 
Critical Systemic  
Responsibility  
with risks of: 
 
1. anthropocentrism 
2. ecocentrism 
 
such risks are countered by the use of the prefix ‘critical’ in relation to systemic 
responsibility.  Figure 1 raises the question regarding the different nature of responses 
required by experts between the dual spheres of responsibility.  
 
 
It is significant that Churchman’s original term for the ‘witness’ (category 10) was the 
‘systems philosopher’ (1979 p.80).  It suggests to me an important reflective 
dimension to the ‘systems practitioner’ (category 7).  The key concern (category 11) 
for the systems philosopher is described by Churchman in terms of ‘enemies of the 
systems approach’ which figures prominently in the title of his 1979 book The 
Systems Approach and Its Enemies.  Ulrich later renamed this category as 
‘emancipation’: 
 
“... it [emancipation] reminds us that social mapping and design is not merely a 
matter of instrumental orientation toward some purpose (as functionalistic 
“systems science” seems to assume), but that for socially rational planning it is 
essential that the planner initiate a process of emancipatory self-reflection on 
the part of the affected” (Ulrich, 1983 p.257 Original italics) 
 
In my view, Churchman’s notion of ‘enemies’ embodies the essence of response-
ability from a critical systemic perspective.  Being responsive to internal components 
(social and ecological factors) of a system of interest is relatively easy. We can 
generally communicate well with clients (or intended beneficiaries), those in 
command of necessary resources, and those other experts with the appropriate know-
how to enable the system to perform.  We are generally familiar with these 
stakeholder groups’ concerns and associated key problems.  In short, within a 
bounded system, we share a common rationale.  Being responsive to factors external 
to a system of interest requires a different type of mindset and skills.  Of course it is 
possible to respond without making an adjustment to the mindset rationale associated 
with the system of interest: 
 
“Social factors seem to be the 'spanner in the works', and some would argue that 
this is a major justification for command & control management, which is what 
often kicks in after some well intentioned initiative has 'failed' to deliver by day 
one”6  
 
Command and control responses represent precisely the type of comfort zone 
response being criticised by Churchman in his very uncomfortable suggestion, as 
paraphrased by Flood (1999), that an effective learning system “entertains attack from 
its worst enemies” (p.61).  In a recent article entitled Terrorism: A Systemic View 
(Ackoff and Strumpfer 2003) the authors document the acute paucity of response to 
the September 11 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the USA. For example, the strategy of 
disrupting al-Qaeda network through legal, economic and other related interventions 
assumes a particular though inappropriate ‘organisational’ metaphor of terrorist 
movements: “Whereas organisations consist of essential parts any of which, if 
destroyed, disrupts the functioning of the whole, networks have no parts on which 
functioning of the whole depends” (p.290).  The article succinctly reveals the 
inappropriateness of conventional approaches to combating terrorism including (i) use 
                                                                 
6 An email student conference communication from a systems practitioner with some experience studying 
on our third level systems course at The Open University (April 2003) 
of violence against violence, (ii) apprehension and imprisonment of terrorists, and (iii) 
the protection of potential targets.  The authors go on to suggest that purposeful 
development initiatives in the very countries that produce terrorists is the only long-
term sustainable approach to terrorism, and that such approaches need to address the 
root cause of terrorism rather than simply attempting to reduce its effects.  The root 
causes are seen as “the inequitable distribution among nations of wealth, quality of 
life, and opportunities to improve either” (p.291).    
 
It is not difficult to envisage the unease and discomfort generated by such a response.  
To be constructively responsive to ‘enemies’ from a critical sys temic perspective 
requires an ability to cope with discomfort. Flood and Ulrich succinctly echo 
Churchman’s ideas on ‘enemies’ in a joint statement affirming their commitment to a 
critical systems perspective: 
 
“… it is anticritical to expect that we can work toward a view with which “we 
all feel comfortable” (a bounded idea promoted by several eminent “systems 
thinkers”), be it with the outputs of methodological activities or indeed the 
methodological approach itself!  Contrary to this, we propose that we should 
remain uncomfortable.  A “truly” critical approach must be open to 
emancipation from itself and even to calls of abolishment, as must the “output” 
of methodological activities.  As we take our theories to the practical world of 
men and women, we mus t equally allow these practical people to bring their 
worlds to our systems intervention” (Flood and Ulrich 1990) 
 
Being response-able in a critical systemic sense requires shifting from a cosy ‘group-
think’ mentality towards embracing instances of discomfort, and being open to 
changing boundaries.  It might be suggested that such aspirations themselves 
constitute a type of group-think characterised by a vocabulary of critical systems 
‘speak’ which merely reinforce and sustain rather than challenge existing boundaries.  
Indeed the critical systems community itself might often be seen by those outside as 
fairly tightly bound.  Such viewpoints need to be seriously taken on board.  A 
response-able community of practice needs to remain openly critical of its own 
premises and promises - to entertain attack from its worst enemies – and to be 
prepared to learn and change as a result. The difficulty and challenge resides in the 
notion that what is outside our immediately relevant systems boundaries is, from the 
perspective of the system of interest, essentially unbounded.7   
 
5 Social and ecological responsibility 
 
The tension or dialectic between a systems rationality and a systems irrationality as 
conceptualised in Churchman’s 1979 The Systems Approach and Its Enemies has 
resonance with similar tensions identified in critical social theory, such as that 
between ‘dominant narratives and subjugated narratives’ (Foucault 1980) or between 
                                                                 
7 Churchman (1979) himself identifies and discusses four generic enemies: politics, morality, religion, 
and aesthetics.  Whilst s uggesting that these particular enemies  “provide a powerful way of learning 
about the systems approach, precisely because they enable the rational mind to step outside itself and to 
observe itself (from the vantage point of the enemies)” (p.24), Churchman later comments “As to the 
exhaustiveness and exclusiveness of the four enemies, the proper response seems to be that the question is 
irrelevant, since these are not logical categories…” (p.26).     
‘systems and lifeworlds’ (Habermas 1984). A particular point of concern for 
Churchman is locating the reflective practitioner (our own position) in such dualisms; 
in short, considering the tension between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  Responsibility requires 
examination of our relationship to those social and ecological factors that have been 
de facto marginalised (‘them’) from the system of interest to which we might be 
serving (‘us’). It also involves reflecting on the pursuit of a wider ideological 
commitment towards emancipation.  
 
In my view, the ideal of ‘emancipation’ from repressive conditions (effects of 
material conditions and/or false consciousness) provides a shared grounding or point 
of departure for critique.  This does not imply that the concept or understanding of 
emancipation ought to remain beyond critique.  With regards to ecological 
responsibility, there remains considerable concern (disquiet/ discomfort) regarding the 
common anthropocentric understanding of emancipation as a point of departure for 
critique.  Just as Midgley (2001; 2003) reminds us that ideas of improvement need to 
be understood temporarily and locally, the precise expression and relevance of 
emancipation will be peculiar to the system of interest which we might be serving.  
Inviting different conceptions of ‘emancipation’ provides a source of discomfort 
characteristic of a critical systemic perspective on social and ecological responsibility.  
The remainder of this section provides two examples of incidences evident in my own 
research experience where issues of responsibility have generated discomfort. 
 
Natural Resource-Use Appraisal in Botswana 
 
Between 1994 and 1998 I was engaged with a doctorate research programme critically 
examining the use of appraisal methods like participatory rural appraisal (PRA) as a 
means for alleviating rural poverty and environmental degradation in less-developed 
countries.  The fieldwork was undertaken in Botswana. A second order research 
system of interest constituted wider boundaries of natural resource-use appraisal for 
use in less-developed countries.  For a detailed summary of the critical systemic 
strategy adopted, see Reynolds (1998). 
 
My first order set of systems of interest consisted of three high profile projects using 
natural resource-use appraisal with varying degrees of participatory planning. The 
ineffective representation and expression of the affected in relation to natural resource 
use in developing countries provokes concern on two counts.  First, there may be a 
generally weak sense of civil society in post-colonial countries, often accentuated in 
rural areas.  Second, the re is an emerging constituency of non-government 
organisations (NGOs), often generously supported by donor agencies, with claims to 
represent various constituencies of ‘the affected’ (particularly the poor, women, and 
ethnic minorities), but also prevalent in the business of providing expertise for 
resource use appraisal.   
 
Natural resource-use appraisal, particularly as practised in developing countries, 
shows how expertise is becoming steadily more influential as a power base.  The 
focus on micro- level political spheres, manifest through attention on PRA exercises, 
might be seen as symptomatic of a wider tendency towards distracting attention away 
from actual centres of authority and power in the development field.  My research 
explored obstacles to the dialogue between the involved and the affected including the 
degree to which ‘experts’ in appraisal systems are willing to lay out their plans for 
wider social (as distinct from ‘systems’) scrutiny. 
 
The research problem is illustrated with correspondence from one of my interviewees; 
a key player in the promotion of PRA in Botswana for more than 7 years in the 1990s.  
The remarks are addressed in response to a public work-in-progress seminar paper 
that I presented on the three projects used as my case study material.  The interviewee 
was part of a large consultancy firm and was appointed  ‘Chief of Mission’ for one of 
the three projects.  The first missive is addressed to the Director of the University 
affiliated  institution responsible for supervising my research. 
 
To: The Director 
 
“As a large donor funded project (USAID  $22 million) we have collaborated 
with a great number of researchers in the last six years, principally from the 
UK, Canada and the USA... We do not expect to emerge unmarked from such 
experiences. Mr Reynolds ... lacks the courage to test his hypothesis in the 
cold waters of objective analysis”  
(18/01/97) 
To: Martin Reynolds 
 
“...Unless you have a sampling strategy your paper remains no more than your 
own personal opinion and thus inappropriate for public presentation...”              
(13/01/97) 
 
My use of italics in the extracts highlights three key features of concern regarding 
responsibility. First, the power sources and financial interests at stake are substantial. 
Natural resource-use appraisal in developing countries is big business. The question is 
what effects might this have on the relative importance of responsibilities to different 
stakeholders? 
 
Second,  whilst acknowledging that responsibility to other experts in the field is 
essential, and that use of ‘sampling strategies’ and ‘cold’ objective hypotheses testing 
undoubtedly have their place and value in the domain of investigation where factors 
might be duly ‘controlled’, the question remains as to whether such scientistic validity 
criteria are necessarily appropriate for all social research.  The remarks also signal a 
tendency towards an over-zealous concern towards demonstrating responsibility to 
fellow ‘experts’ (technocentrism).   
 
Finally, there is the related concern brought up regarding public presentation.  This of 
course is ultimately a matter of judgement and responsibility which, for me,  invites 
the question -  what opportunities of response exist for those affected by inquiry?  
 
My seminar paper and presentation was undoubtedly a provocation to project 
personnel from all three projects.  In effect, I set myself up as the ‘enemy’.  The 
discomfort expressed at having my paper publicly presented was anticipated.  Ample 
time was provided prior to the presentation for the project managers and others to 
make a considered response. My decision to present what I knew to be contentious 
issues at a public seminar was based upon a principle that project managers in the 
natural resource sector have privileged and responsible social positions in a country 
endowed with natural resources yet subject to oppressive levels of rural poverty and 
growing land degradation.  A key issue raised in the seminar was the extent to which 
appraisal experts might themselves be held response-able to those affected by their 
work. A claim made in my paper was that all too often the natural resource experts 
consider their work outputs as ‘internal’ and ‘final’ products rather than as part of a 
wider more purposeful endeavour.  
 
Two postscripts are worth making.  Firstly, the seminar event was reportedly one of 
the best attended of such research- in-progress events held in Botswana. Perhaps 
anticipated discomfort might be as much an alluring attraction as it is something 
perceived to generally avoid! Secondly, despite the provocation, the response being 
illustrated above was not typical of all project personnel who either attended and/or 
reported back to me on the seminar paper.   I received a range of critical feedback 
from the event, all of which significantly shaped the eventual output of my thesis.  In 
short, my own sense of discomfort through this engagement generated improved 
insights. 
 
Operational Research and Environmental Management  
 
In 1999 Gerald Midgley and myself from the Centre for Systems Studies (CSS) at the 
University of Hull were engaged with an action research project designed to create an 
agenda for the future role of operational research (OR) in environmental planning and 
management.  The research involved individual and group interviews with planners 
associated with the public sector, business organisations and pressure groups, as well 
as providers of expert support to such planners. Our second order system of interest 
was the community of OR/ systems practitioners (including ourselves) and others 
with relevant expertise involved with supporting environmental management and 
planning. For detailed references on the ideas presented below, plus a full account of 
our research strategy and output, see Midgley and Reynolds (2001). 
 
A first order system of interest for the initial phase of our research consisted of what 
might be called the ‘users’ of expert support (generally referred to as environmental 
planners). A series of interviews were undertaken with planners from the public 
sector, business organisations and environmental pressure groups, as well as expert 
‘providers’ or practitioners, to identify key concerns.8  Three generic issues were 
found to recur in both the environmental management literature and the interview data 
generated in our study: 
 
1. Complexity and uncertainty (regarding the unpredictability of natural and social 
phenomena);  
2. Multiple and often conflicting values (of those involved in environmental 
planning); and 
3. Political effects (on those not involved in planning processes, including non-
human nature). 
 
                                                                 
8 We found this conceptual distinction between providers and users of expert support a highly useful 
heuristic device whilst of course fully acknowledging that considerable overlap exist between these two 
groups. 
The third recurring generic theme is recognition by expert practitioners and users of 
expert support of the need to account for the political effects of planning on people 
and non-human nature. Whilst a significant portion of the environmental planning 
work has been focused on risk management, this is usually seen as a purely technical 
function: the risks inherent in different scenarios need to be assessed (and sometimes 
quantified in financial terms) to inform decision-making. The responsibility is 
typically internal, towards those in command of resources.  Risk assessors are 
generally loath to accept the possibility that whether a risk is worth taking involves 
making a value judgement.  When ‘problems’ are identified, these are predominantly 
issues of the co-ordination and integration of programmes rather than with their 
implementation, where issues of ‘the affected’ are more likely to be raised. 
 
Specific examples of political effects of expert support were cited in our research.  For 
example, despite the fact that producing adequate sustainability indicators is seen as 
problematic by the vast majority of writers (a claim supported by our own literature 
review), this consensus of opinion is not being transmitted to those interested parties 
who stand to be affected by the practical decisions informed by such indicators. 
Evidence suggests that transferring forms of environmental impact assessment 
designed for affluent countries into less developed countries had significantly negative 
effects. Others describe the misuse of OR for social and environmental planning in 
vulnerable communities, highlighting issues like “escapism in figures”, “clouding 
issues to make them unintelligible”, “giving scientific backing to predefined policies”,  
“using a cannon to kill a fly”, “model fetishism”, “focusing on the wrong issues”, 
“satisfying ego trips of foreign researchers” etc.!(p.33). Such issues clearly signal 
tendencies towards a technocentric responsibility (to other experts) rather than a 
sincere client-based responsibility (to ‘users’ or intended beneficiaries).  
 
In moving to our second order system of interest, expert practitioners, the history of 
OR has been characterised by a continual dialogue between theory and practice; 
planning and implementation. There has long been a concern for making OR more 
relevant and useful to the less well off and less privileged sections of society. In the 
1980s this imperative gave rise to ‘Community OR’, a distinct community of practice 
amongst OR practitioners. Community OR is sometimes described as the use of OR 
with community groups and/or voluntary organisations, although in practice 
Community OR has also been undertaken with a variety of health and welfare 
organisations as well as multi-agency groups serving the community  
 
The question is, should there be equivalent formal developments in OR to serve those 
affected by environmental planning? There have certainly been none yet, although 
there are examples in the literature of people arguing for methodological developments 
to ensure that the affected are taken into account in environmental planning and 
management. For example: (i) tools for ‘political sensitivity mapping’ as a means to 
counter the implementation effects of expert-driven sustainability indicators; (ii) an 
ethically based ‘political model’ for public debate to give formal expression to the 
dialectic between the ‘natural science approach’ and the ‘neo-classical economic 
approach’; (iii) promotion of ‘deliberative groups’ for urban planning, which are 
different from ‘focus groups’ in that the former are designed to specifically address the 
concerns of those affected by plans (and the affected are kept at a distance from 
decision makers); (iv) a focus on the informal economy of waste pickers, itinerant 
buyers, small scrap dealers, wholesalers and households in India to design more 
effective forms of urban solid waste management; (v) designs for a more community 
based environmental management system; and (vi) development of a permanent 
‘citizens clearing house’ to provide views that can be considered alongside experts’ 
risk assessments for the disposal of hazardous waste (p.34). 
 
There are certainly many writers in OR and environmental management with a 
commitment to account for the effects of planning on people and the environment. In 
our view, in considering whether a formal sub-discipline of OR specialising in this 
should be established (like Community OR has been established to work with 
community groups and voluntary organisations), it is worth asking whether this is 
going to raise awareness of the need for OR practitioners to deal with the political 
effects of environmental planning, or whether it is going to marginalise these 
concerns. As we see it, if OR practitioners are going to have any success in 
establishing their specialism as a key contributor to environmental planning and 
management, they have to be able to deal with all three of the recurrent, generic 
issues uncovered by our research (complexity and uncertainty; multiple values; and 
political effects). Political effects are arguably no more and no less important than the 
other two.   
 
One of the recommendations coming out of our project was that Environmental and 
Community OR practitioners (amongst others) could usefully form an alliance to 
implement the agenda (see Midgley and Reynolds (2003) for more specific discussion 
on this issue). We surfaced three reasons why this alliance would be beneficial: the 
need for a critical mass of activists; the importance of bringing environmental issues 
into Community OR; and the need for Environmental OR practitioners to learn more 
about the structured facilitation of community development. Development of such an 
alliance is not easy as it affects long-standing boundaries. Hopefully, continued 
debate will give rise to co-operation across the boundaries of these hitherto mostly 
separate enterprises. 
 
6 Summary 
 
A critical systemic perspective on social and ecological responsibility requires 
continual critical examination of our boundaries in relation to those factors (social and 
ecological) in the environment of the system of interest to which we might be serving.  
It involves reflecting on the rationale of our particular system of interest with the view 
of possibly changing the boundaries (thereby generating ‘improvement’) in pursuit of 
a wider ideological commitment towards emancipation. 
 
The two examples discussed in the previous section signal issues of discomfort that 
arise from a critical systemic perspective on social and ecological responsibility.  In 
both instances, two systems of interest can be identified; a first order one relating to 
the boundaries of  the subject matter being researched, and a secondary one relating to 
the researcher’s own boundaries.  In each case, the sources of discomfort arise from 
perceived ‘enemies’.  In the Botswana-research case, boundaries of prominent 
responsibilities were identified amongst expert practitioners in the field of natural 
resource-use appraisal associated with three high-profile projects.  These appeared to 
conform more with an in-house ‘systems responsibility’ (see Fig.1) rather than a 
critical external sense of responsibility.   Clearly, this assertion itself constituted ‘an 
enemy’ to at least some project personnel. Certainly it generated unease.  The 
example illustrates two features of critical systemic responsibility.  First, in playing 
out an ‘enemy’ role, there is the possibility of generating further entrenchment of 
dogmatic posturing.  The command and control response to an ‘enemy’ can invoke 
expression of responsibilities to other stakeholders in the system – decision makers 
and/or collegiate bodies of professional expertise.  Whilst this might be seen in 
immediate negative terms  as reactionary, in the longer term I would argue that such 
responses serve to make the situation more transparent. Second, the example gives a 
feel to the potential discomfort experienced by the practitioner (myself!) engaged with 
the dual endeavour of responding to factors within a system (as an ‘expert’ within a 
research community) and to factors outside a system (as a ‘witness’). 
 
The second example again illustrates effects from two levels of interest. With respect 
to the first order system of interest, the boundaries of ‘planners’ or users of 
environmental expertise were expressed in terms of three recurring generic themes.  
The third of these, political effects, provided the key source of discomfort for 
planners.  A key disquieting ‘enemy’ for environmental planners and managers is the 
unforeseen consequences of implementation, both with regards to effects on social 
and ecological factors.   For our second order system of interest, the boundaries are 
represented by disciplinary interests including community development, environment, 
agriculture, development studies, complex systems, etc..  The challenge for OR/ 
systems practitioners is seen as overcoming the ‘enemy’ of  unfamiliar territory.  Writ 
large, of course, this ‘enemy’ might be associated with any systemic interdisciplinary 
endeavour.  
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